Analyzing Cascading Failures in Smart Grids under Random and Targeted
  Attacks by Ruj, Sushmita & Pal, Arindam
Analyzing Cascading Failures in Smart Grids
under Random and Targeted Attacks
Sushmita Ruj† and Arindam Pal‡
† Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India. Email: sush@isical.ac.in
‡ TCS Innovation Labs, Kolkata, India. Email: arindamp@gmail.com
Abstract—We model smart grids as complex interdependent
networks, and study targeted attacks on smart grids for the
first time. A smart grid consists of two networks: the power
network and the communication network, interconnected by
edges. Occurrence of failures (attacks) in one network triggers
failures in the other network, and propagates in cascades
across the networks. Such cascading failures can result in
disintegration of either (or both) of the networks. Earlier works
considered only random failures. In practical situations, an
attacker is more likely to compromise nodes selectively.
We study cascading failures in smart grids, where an attacker
selectively compromises the nodes with probabilities propor-
tional to their degrees; high degree nodes are compromised
with higher probability. We mathematically analyze the sizes of
the giant components of the networks under targeted attacks,
and compare the results with the corresponding sizes under
random attacks. We show that networks disintegrate faster for
targeted attacks compared to random attacks. A targeted attack
on a small fraction of high degree nodes disintegrates one or
both of the networks, whereas both the networks contain giant
components for random attack on the same fraction of nodes.
Keywords: Complex networks, Percolation theory, Smart
grids, Cascading failures, Random and targeted attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grids are next generation electricity grids, in which
the power network and the communication network work
in tandem. Power grids have suffered severe attacks in
the past. The black out of Northern US/Canada and that
of Italy in 2003 affected the lives of millions of people
and resulted in huge monetary losses. More recently, the
largest blackout in the world occurred in India in July
2012. The complete shutdown of the Northern, Eastern, and
Northeastern power grids in the country affected over 620
million people. Such calamities could have been avoided, if
the power grid functioned properly. In order to ensure that
the electric grid functions smoothly, it is important that the
control information is collected and transmitted in an orderly
fashion, and the existing systems be highly automated. Smart
grids promise to fulfill this vision by synchronizing the
power network with the communication network. The idea
is to replace the existing SCADA (Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition) system by an intelligent and automatic
communication network.
The power network consists of power plants, generation
and distribution stations, whereas the communication net-
work consists of sensors attached to appliances to collect
information, aggregator sensors to aggregate information
and smart meters for monitoring and billing. The smart
meters in home area networks, building area networks, and
neighborhood area networks are responsible for aggregating,
processing and transmitting data and control information for
proper functioning of the smart grid. The question is how to
make such a network robust and fault-tolerant. Researchers
have addressed smart grid architectures [1] and the problem
of cascading failures [4], in which a small fault propagates
throughout the network and affects a large part of the
network. Most of the current techniques and models use
concepts from distributed systems. However, because of the
large size of smart grids and their unique properties, new
models, interconnection patterns, and analysis techniques are
required to increase the robustness of networks.
Recently, Huang et al. [9] initiated the study of modeling
and analyzing smart grids using interdependent complex
networks. A smart grid can be thought of as two complex
networks, which are interconnected. The question is how
to make this network robust and fault tolerant. In order to
provide a solution, we have to understand what kind of faults
and attacks can take place and how faults propagate in the
network. The failure of nodes in one network results in the
disruption of the other network, which in turn affects the
first network. This type of failure propagates in a cascading
manner and was the main reason for the blackouts in the
US and in India. To understand this cascading failure, we
need to study the structure of the networks. In this paper, we
model and study smart grids as complex networks and show
the effect of cascading failure, when adversaries compromise
nodes in the network.
Though cyber-security issues have been studied in details
[17], modeling the network in order to make it resilient still
needs lot of research. The main contribution of this paper
is to study the effect of targeted attacks in smart grids, in
which the attacker selectively disrupts communication nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on targeted
attacks on smart grids using complex network model. We
argue that an adversary is more likely to attack selected
high degree nodes, rather than attacking nodes randomly.
As an example, we consider the recent Stuxnet worm [11]
which was targeted on Siemens PCs and caused large-scale
ar
X
iv
:1
40
2.
68
09
v1
  [
cs
.SI
]  
27
 Fe
b 2
01
4
2destruction to industrial control systems. Yagan et al. [20]
studied cascading failures in cyber-physical systems. They
studied different interdependent Erdos-Renyi (ER) networks
[13], but they did not consider scale-free networks, which are
used to represent power and communication networks. Till
date, all works [9], [10], [20] on complex networks models
of smart grid have considered only random attacks. Huang
et al. [10] addressed the cost of maintaining such networks
by analyzing the number of support links between networks.
Whereas increasing the support links might make the inter-
dependent networks stronger, large number of support links
imply higher cost of maintenance. They suggested that smart
grids should have some nodes which are connected to power
nodes (also called operation centers) and the rest of the nodes
are relaying nodes. Using such a model, they studied the
resilience of the network under random attacks. According
to their model, each control node is linked to n power nodes
and each power node is operated by k operation centers.
A. Problem statement and our contribution
We model the smart grid as a complex interdependent
network consisting of two networks, the power network and
the communication network. Both the power network and the
communication network are scale-free (SF) networks, where
the degree distribution follows the power law, pk ∝ k−α,
where pk is the fraction of nodes of degree k and α is the
power-law parameter specific to the network. Support links
are randomly assigned from one network to another, such
that a power node is controlled by multiple communication
nodes, and functions properly as long as at least one such
link exists. In our model, we consider targeted attacks on
the communication network. We mathematically analyze the
effect of cascading failure for this type of attack and find out
the sizes of giant components when nodes are compromised.
We compare the following attack models: random at-
tacks, targeted attacks, and a combination of targeted and
random attacks. We show that an adversary has a definite
advantage if it compromises nodes selectively. In targeted
attack, the adversary compromises a node with a probability
proportional to the degree of the node. Our main conclusion
is that by launching a targeted attack, an adversary can
disrupt significant part of the network. For a large network,
compromising about 2.2% of the network can disrupt either
of the networks under targeted attack, whereas under random
attack, the networks are still connected and work smoothly.
B. Organization
The paper is organized as follows: Related works are
presented in Section II. The network model, attack model,
and preliminary material on complex networks is presented
in Section III. Cascading failure is mathematically analyzed
in Section IV. In Section V, we present experimental results
to understand our model and make some conclusions. We
conclude in Section VI with directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORKS
Smart grid communication and network architecture have
been widely studied in [1], [12], [18]. Most smart grid
literature concentrate on distribution of power [21], balancing
supply and demand [15], detecting and predicting faults
[4], designing network architecture which are fault tolerant
[20]. The bulk of literature on fault tolerance address cyber-
physical systems in general [20] and use general models and
techniques of distributed systems.
Fault tolerance in power grids has been studied widely
in the past. The study of the model, analysis of structure,
increasing the robustness of power grids have been studied
using complex networks. Here, electric distribution stations,
transmission stations, generation centers are modeled as
nodes. Two nodes are connected by a link, if there is
power flow from one node to the other. The structure of the
underlying graph has been widely studied, to find the effect
of node failures. When certain nodes fail (or are attacked),
the corresponding links are disrupted. This affects other
nodes, whose links fail in return. Such failures propagate in
a cascading manner throughout the network. Thus, a small
fraction of nodes can disrupt a large part of the network. It
has been shown that the graph structure underlying a power
grid follows a power law distribution [13]. An extensive
survey appears in [14].
Although, complex networks have been widely used to
study different networks like social networks, biological
networks, citation networks, power networks, etc [13], smart
grid networks have not been widely studied. Huang et al.
[9] introduced the study of smart grids using complex in-
terdependent networks, in which the power network and the
communication network are modeled as individual networks
which have scale-free property. The links connecting nodes
within a network are called intralinks. The networks are
connected to each other via links (also called interlinks), such
that a power node depends on communication nodes and vice
versa. Such a network is called interdependent network.
Interdependent networks were introduced by Buldyrev et
al. [2]. They studied the effect of failure cascades in such
networks. The failure of a few nodes in the communication
network will affect nodes in the power network, which will
further affect nodes in the communication network. Thus,
failures propagate in cascades till a steady state is reached or
when either or both of the networks disintegrate. We say that
a network disintegrates if there are no giant components in
the network. A giant component is a connected component
of size Θ(N), where N is the number of nodes in the
network. Since then, a number of researchers have analyzed
interdependent networks.
The initial study by Buldyrev et al. [2] studied the case
where the two networks are of the same size, and there
is a one-to-one correspondence between nodes which are
joined by an interlink. Shao et al. [16] studied multiple
support interlinks, where a node in the power network was
3connected to multiple nodes in the communication network
and vice-versa. Most of the results have been analyzed
experimentally, because closed-form analytical solutions are
difficult to obtain. A special case of support links, where
nodes having identical degree are connected across networks
was studied in [3]. It has been observed in all these cases
that interdependent systems make the network much more
vulnerable to attacks, compared to a single network.
A well-known result in complex networks is that, randomly
removing 95% of the nodes in the Internet (which is a
scale-free network) can still result in a connected network.
However, strategically removing even 2.5% of the nodes can
disrupt the whole network [7]. Such a result motivates us to
study the effect of targeted attacks on smart grids. In case
of smart grids, an adversary is more likely to compromise
nodes of strategic importance like hubs, than nodes of low
degree. Thus, selective attacks give substantially different
results compared to random attacks.
Targeted attacks on interdependent networks has been
studied in [8]. They considered networks of the same size,
each node in the power network being connected to an unique
node in the communication network. The nodes are attacked
such that a high degree node has higher probability of being
attacked. They studied different networks like SF-SF or ER-
ER and experimentally calculated the critical probabilities at
which networks disintegrate They showed that targeted attack
leads to faster disintegration than random attack. In other
words, strategically compromising a few nodes results in
the removal of the giant component, where as compromising
even a large number of nodes randomly, does not result in
the removal the giant component.
Instead of studying interdependent networks consisting of
two networks, Dong et al. [6] studied targeted attacks on a
network of networks. Zheng and Liu [19] proposed a solution
for making a network robust against targeted attacks by
suggesting a onion-like structure. Here high-degree nodes are
present towards the center in clusters and low-degree nodes
are present in concentric rings depending upon their degree.
They analyzed results from power networks. Their technique
is however restricted to single networks.
III. SMART GRID MODEL
We will first discuss the network model and then the attack
model.
A. Network Model
We consider two interdependent scale free networks, a
communication network NA = (VA, αA) and a power net-
work NB = (VB , αB), where nA = |VA| and nB = |VB |
are the number of nodes in the communication and power
networks, respectively, and αA and αB are the power-
law coefficients. This implies that, NA has the power law
distribution PA(k) ∝ k−αA , which means that the fraction
of nodes with degree k is PA(k). Similarly, NB has the
power law distribution PB(k) ∝ k−αB . We assume that there
are more communication nodes than power stations, which
implies that nA > nB .
The interlinks, also called support links [16] are directed
edges from one network to the other. We assume that a com-
munication link supports one power station and is powered
by one power node, meaning that both the in-degree and
out-degree of a communication node is one. A power node
is controlled by multiple communication node and supplies
power to multiple communication nodes, meaning the in-
degree of a power node is greater or equal to one and there
is no restriction on the out-degree of a power node. Links are
assigned randomly from the communication network NA to
the power network NB . Let k˜A denote the support degree
of a node in Network A. This implies that there are k˜A
nodes in NB , that support a node in NA. Let P˜A(k˜A) denote
the degree distribution of support links from NB to NA.
P˜B(k˜B) can be defined analogously. From the structure of
the network, k˜A is equal to one for all nodes in NA.
To calculate the degree distribution P˜B(k˜B), we note that
the problem of assigning support links from NA to NB is
equivalent to assigning nA balls randomly into nB bins. If
Xi denotes the random variable that counts the number of
balls in bin i, then,
Pr[Xi = k] =
(
nA
k
) (
1
nB
)k (
1− 1nB
)nB−k
.
Thus, the degree distribution P˜B(k˜B) follows Binomial dis-
tribution with parameters Bin(nA, 1nB ).
B. Attack Model
We consider targeted attack on communication network,
in which the attacker attacks a node with probability pro-
portional to the degree of the node. This implies that a
high degree node is more prone to attack than a low degree
node. Targeted attacks are more likely to arise in real-
world situations, as we have seen during the recent Stuxnet
attack. Attacking the high degree node is also intuitive, since
disrupting the high degree nodes result in more connections
being disrupted, thus disrupting the network.
C. Giant Component
A giant component in a graph on n vertices is a maximal
connected component with at least cn vertices, for some
constant c. If c = 0.5, this means that the giant component
should have at least half of the vertices in the graph. A vertex
can be deleted from the graph in two ways.
1) If the vertex is attacked.
2) If the vertex is not attacked, but all its support links on
the other network has been attacked.
Note that due to this kind of cascading failure of nodes,
many more nodes will be compromised. This is different
from the normal scenario, where only the attacked nodes are
compromised.
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Fig. 1. The smart grid as an interdependent complex network.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
NA Communication network
NB Power network
nA, nB Number of nodes in NA and NB
k Degree of a node
PA(k) Degree distribution of communication network
PB(k) Degree distribution of power network
P˜A(k˜A) Degree distribution of support degree of a node
in NA
P˜B(k˜B) Degree distribution of support degree of a node
in NB
GAn Giant component of NA at stage n
GBn Giant component of NB at stage n
qAk Probability of a node having excess degree k (i.e.,
total degree k + 1) in NA
qBk Probability of a node having excess degree k (i.e.,
total degree k + 1) in NB
rAn Fraction of removed nodes in NA at stage n, due
to removal of nodes in NB at stage n− 1
rBn Fraction of removed nodes in NB at stage n, due
to removal of nodes in NA at stage n− 1
µAn Fraction of functional nodes in NA at stage n
µBn Fraction of functional nodes in NB at stage n
D. Notations
We have used the notations in Table III-D throughout
the paper. Figure 1 shows smart grid as an interdependent
network.
IV. MODELING CASCADING FAILURE DUE TO TARGETED
ATTACK ON COMMUNICATION NETWORK
We first analyze the targeted attack on communication
network and then show how the failure propagates across
the interdependent networks in stages.
A. Targeted attack on the communication network
Let φk be the probability that a node i of degree k is not
removed. In a targeted attack, the attacker removes a node
with a probability proportional to the degree of the node. So,
a high degree node is removed with higher probability. Note
that,
φk = 1− deg(i)∑
v∈VA deg(v)
= 1− Ak
−αA
2mA
,
Here deg(i) = Ak−αA is the degree of node i and mA is
the number of edges in NA. We note that αA = 0 represents
random removal of nodes.
We will first calculate the size of the giant component
GA1. Let u denote the average probability that a node is
not connected to the giant cluster via one of its neighbors.
Consider a node of degree k. Probability that it is not
connected to the giant component via any of its neighbors is
uk.
Probability of it being in the giant component =
Probability that it is not attacked · probability that one of
its neighbors is in the giant component.
Thus, probability of it being in the giant component is φk(1−
uk). Averaging over the degree distribution PA(k), we can
calculate the fraction of nodes in the initial giant component
as
µA1 =
∞∑
k=0
PA(k)φk(1− uk)
=
∞∑
k=0
PA(k)φk −
∞∑
k=0
PA(k)φku
k
= f0(1)− f0(u),
(1)
where,
f0(z) =
∞∑
k=0
PA(k)φkz
k. (2)
We will now show how to calculate u. A node is not con-
nected to the giant component when either of the following
cases arise.
• The node is attacked and thus removed,
• The node is present, but not connected to any node in
the giant component.
Let k be the excess degree of a neighboring node. The
original degree of a node is one more than the excess degree,
i.e., k + 1 [13]. Probability that a neighbor is removed is
1−φk+1. Probability that a neighbor is present, but the node
itself is not present in the giant component is φk+1uk.
5Hence using [13], u can be calculated as,
u =
∞∑
k=0
qAk(1− φk+1 + φk+1uk)
= 1− f1(1) + f1(u),
(3)
where,
f1(z) =
∞∑
k=0
qAkφk+1z
k. (4)
Note that qAk , the probability of a node having excess degree
k in NA can be given by qAk =
(k+1)PA(k+1)
〈kA〉 [13]. It can be
seen that,
∑∞
k=0 qAk = 1. Substituting the value of qAk+1 ,
the value of f1(z) can be calculated as,
f1(z) =
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)PA(k + 1)
〈kA〉 φk+1z
k
=
1
〈kA〉
∞∑
k=1
kPA(k)φkz
k−1,
(5)
where, 〈kA〉 is the average degree of nodes in NA. We
observe that,
f1(z) =
f ′0(z)
g′A0(1)
, (6)
where gA0(z) is the generating function,
gA0(z) =
∞∑
k=0
PA(k)z
k. (7)
B. Stage II: Effect of cascading failure on power network
Due to the attack on communication nodes, the power
network is affected. A node in the power network NB is
functional, if a node in NB has at least one support link
from NA. Initially, at stage II all nodes in NB are in
the giant component. We consider all those nodes which
are supported by nodes not in GA1. Such nodes will not
remain functional because they will be cut off from the
communication network. Probability that a node is not in
the giant component GA1 is 1 − µA1 . Suppose, a node
is supported by k˜B nodes in NA. Probability that the k˜B
neighboring nodes are not in GA1 is (1− µA1)k˜B . Fraction
of nodes in NB disconnected due to attack on NA is given
by,
rB2 =
∞∑
k˜B=0
P˜B(k˜B)(1− µA1)k˜B (8)
The fraction of nodes remaining in NB is given by 1−rB2 .
This is similar to the random removal of vertices. The fraction
of nodes in the resulting giant component can be calculated
by the technique in Appendix A as
µB2 = (1− rB2)(1− gB0(u)), (9)
where,
u = 1− φ+ φgB1(u), (10)
gB0(u) =
∞∑
k=0
PB(k)u
k (11)
and
gB1(z) =
∞∑
k=0
qBkz
k. (12)
C. Stage III: Cascading failure in communication network
We will now study the effect of cascading failure in
the communication network, due to the failure in power
networks. Each node in NA is supported by only one link
from the power network. If a node in NB fails, then the
communication node it supports, also fails. The fraction of
nodes in NA which fail due to failure of node in NB is given
by,
rA3 =
∞∑
k˜A=0
P˜A(k˜A)(1− µB2). (13)
We can consider that these nodes are randomly removed
in NA and find the giant component resulting due to this re-
moval of nodes. The fraction of nodes in the giant component
which result from this random compromise is calculated as
shown in Appendix A, as,
µA3 = (1− rA3)(1− gA0(u)), (14)
where,
u = 1− rA3 + rA3gA1(u), (15)
gA0(u) =
∞∑
k=0
PA(k)u
k (16)
and
gA1(z) =
∞∑
k=0
qAkz
k (17)
.
D. Stage IV: Cascading failure in power network
We now calculate the number of nodes in the power
network which are connected to nodes not in the giant
component in the communication network. The fraction of
nodes which are removed because they have all their support
links from the nodes not in the giant component of NA, is
given by,
rB4 =
∞∑
k˜B=0
P˜B(k˜B)(1− µA3)k˜B . (18)
The giant component can be calculated as in Appendix A.
6E. Giant components and steady state conditions
We will now calculate the size of the giant component at
steady state. Let, rA2n−1 (n ≥ 1) be the fraction of nodes
in NA that are removed due to the removal of nodes in NB
at stage 2n− 2. For n = 1, the analysis is given in Section
IV-A. Then,
rA2n−1 =
∞∑
k˜A=0
(1− µB2n−2)P˜A(k˜A). (19)
Proceeding similarly as above, the general expression for
nodes for the fraction of nodes in the giant component at the
(2n− 1)-th stage in the communication network is given by,
µA2n−1 = (1− rA2n−1)(1− gA0(u)), (20)
where,
u = 1− φA2n−1 + φA2n−1gA1(u), (21)
gA0(u) =
∞∑
k=0
PA(k)u
k (22)
and
gA1(z) =
∞∑
k=0
qAkz
k. (23)
Similarly, let, rB2n be the fraction of nodes in NB that are
removed due to the removal of nodes in NA at stage 2n− 1.
Then,
rB2n =
∞∑
k˜B=0
P˜B(k˜B)(1− µA2n−1)k˜B (24)
The fraction of nodes in the giant component of NB at stage
2n is given by,
µB2n = (1− rB2n)(1− gB0(u)), (25)
where,
u = 1− φ+ φgA1(u), (26)
gB0(u) =
∞∑
k=0
PB(k)u
k (27)
and
gB1(z) =
∞∑
k=0
qBkz
k (28)
.
We arrive at a steady state when,
µA2n−1 = µA2n+1 = µA2n+3 = . . . (29)
µB2n−2 = µB2n = µB2n+2 = . . . (30)
It is difficult to solve these systems of equations analyti-
cally. So, we generate the smart grid using different random
graph models and simulate the effect of targeted and random
attacks on these graphs. The results of this study is given in
the next section.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Set-up
In order to simulate a smart grid, we use the network
library igraph [5] on C. We consider two networks: the power
network and the communication network, both of which
are scale-free networks. For each communication node, an
interlink is assigned by choosing a power node at random.
We consider three types of attack on the communication
network – targeted, random and mixed (combination of the
first two). In the random attack, we choose x nodes uniformly
at random from all the nodes without replacement. In the
targeted attack, we choose x nodes without replacement, such
that the probability of choosing a node is proportional to
the degree. For mixed attacks, we select half of the nodes
for targeted attack and half of the nodes for random attack.
Finally, we study the effect of compromise by running the
experiment 50 times for each input x. Every time the same
graphs are considered.
B. Experimental results, observations and inferences
In Figure 2, the power network consists of 1,000 nodes
and the communication network consists of 10,000 nodes.
The communication/power network is generated as a scale-
free network using a power-law degree distribution. We have
plotted the size of the giant component (as a fraction of
the size of the communication/power network) against the
number of nodes attacked in the communication network.
We observe that for a given value of the number of at-
tacked nodes (only nodes in the communication network are
attacked), the fraction of nodes in the giant component of
the communication network is highest for random attacks
and lowest for targeted attack. The corresponding fraction
for mixed attacks lies somewhere in the middle. We also
see that for the same fraction of nodes compromised, the
giant component of the power network disintegrates faster
for targeted attacks, compared to random attacks. We see that
on compromising 2200 nodes, there is no giant component
when targeted attack occurs, whereas giant component exists,
under random attacks. This is expected, as attacking higher
degree nodes result in a faster disintegration of the network,
resulting in smaller components.
In Figures 3 and 4, the communication network consists
of 2000 nodes, whereas the power network consists of 1000
nodes. In Figure 3, we have plotted the size of the giant
component (as a fraction of the size of the communication
network) against the number of attacked nodes. The com-
munication network is generated using (i) a scale-free (SF)
network using a power-law degree distribution, (ii) the Erdos-
Renyi (ER) G(n, p) model with p = 0.01, and (iii) the Erdos-
Renyi (ER) G(n, p) model with p = 0.005. Only nodes in
the communication network are attacked. In Figure 4, we
have plotted the size of the giant component (as a fraction
of the size of the power network) against the number of
attacked nodes. The power network is generated using the
7same models as mentioned above. From Figures 3 and 4 we
see that, for all the three types of attacks, the sizes of the
giant components for ER graphs are comparable. The power
and communication networks will be more fault tolerant to
targeted attacks for Erdos-Renyi networks, compared to scale
free networks.
Fig. 2. Variation of giant component size with number of attacked nodes
for targeted, random, and mixed attacks.
Fig. 3. Variation of giant component size with number of attacked nodes
in the communication network for scale-free and Erdos-Renyi models.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We model the power and communication networks as two
interdependent networks, and analyze cascading failure in
smart grids for targeted attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work which addresses targeted attack on
smart grids, which are modeled as interdependent networks.
We have given a mathematical expression for the sizes of
giant components when nodes are compromised. We have
Fig. 4. Variation of giant component size with number of attacked nodes
in the power network for scale-free and Erdos-Renyi models.
carried out experiments to show that a targeted attack gives
an advantage to the adversary over random attacks.
A challenging open problem is to obtain a closed-form
solution for the size of the giant component from the math-
ematical analysis that we have presented. Another important
question is to present a good model of smart grids, which
will be resilient to both random and targeted attacks. The
structure of both the power and communication networks
and the assignment of interlinks need to be studied. Thus,
an important question is to find which network model and
interconnection model will increase the resilience of the
smart grid. In the future, the smart grid will be an internet
of things, so a future direction of work is to propose a
model, which will be resilient to attacks and can disseminate
information rapidly in the network.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATING GIANT COMPONENT UPON
RANDOM REMOVAL OF VERTICES
Let us consider a network N have a degree distribution
P (k). Let φ be the fraction of nodes left after random
removal of nodes. Let u be the probability that a vertex is not
connected to the giant component via a particular neighbor.
If the vertex has degree k, then average probability that it is
not in the giant component is
g0(u) =
∑
k
P (k)uk, (31)
where g0(z) =
∑
k P (k)z
k, is the generating function for
the degree distribution. Hence, the probability that a vertex
belongs to a giant component is 1 − g0(u). However, the
vertex itself present with a probability φ. Thus fraction of
nodes in the giant component is
µN = φ(1− g0(u)) (32)
In order to calculate the value of u we note that a node
i is not in the giant component if it is either removed, or it
is present but not connected to the giant component via any
of its neighbors. The first condition happens with probability
1−φ whereas the second condition happens with probability
φuk. Since node i can be reached following an edge, the
value of k follows the excess degree distribution
qk =
(k + 1)qk+1
〈k〉 , (33)
where 〈k〉 is the average degree of the network. Thus,
averaging over this distribution we get
u =
∞∑
k=0
qk(1− φ+ φuk)
= 1− φ+
∞∑
k=0
qku
k
1− φ+ φg1(u),
(34)
where
g1(z) =
∞∑
k=0
qkz
k (35)
is the generating function for excess degree distribution.
